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THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM
ACT OF 1995: RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF
THE RICO AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Words in a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation, unless they are so
clear, strong and imperative, that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or
unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied.'
Leges et consuetutiones futuris certum est dare formam negotiis, non ad facta
praeterita revocari, nisi nominatim etiam de praeterito tempore adhuc pendentibus
negotiis cautum six.
The principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under
the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal human
appeal.'
In 1995, the Congress ended a ten year struggle to curtail "frivolous" securities
litigation by enacting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("The Re-
form Act")." The Reform Act includes many sweeping changes in both procedural and
substantive law governing the activities of private parties under federal securities law.'
It also contains an amendment to 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) eliminating securities fraud as a
predicate offense for civil RICO.6 In essence, defrauded investors are no longer able
1. United States v. Heth, 3 U.S. 399, 413 (1806).
2. Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurispru-
dence, 20 MiNN L. REv. 775 n.4 (1936) (citing the Corpus Juris Civilis at Codes 1, 14, 7. Smead
translates this passage: "[L]aws and customs should be given an operation on future transactions
[ .... ] and that they cannot be recalled to past facts unless it is stated expressly that they apply
either to past time or to pending transactions."
3. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring).
4. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
5. John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW 335 (1996). Some of the changes include safe
harbors for forward looking statements, heightened pleading standards, fee shifting and proportionate
liability; see id. at 351-368 for a more detailed explanation of these provisions.
6. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941
(1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§1961-68 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989)). "RICO," as it is com-
monly known, was enacted in 1970 as Title IX of the Organized Crime Controls Act of 1970. RICO
was intended to deal with the problem of "enterprise criminality" that is "patterns" of violence, cor-
ruption, fraud in government, labor or criminal operations. RICO is a particularly powerful tool for law
enforcement agencies and private individuals because it broadens the scope of criminal and civil reme-
dies to include fines, imprisonment, forfeiture, injunctions and treble damages for injured parties. See
G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Im-
pact on Substanive, Accessory, Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy Liability, 33 CRIM. L. REv. 1345
(1996) for a detailed analysis of the RICO statute.
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to use RICO, absent a criminal conviction, to bring securities fraud suits. While the
amendment to RICO is controversial, the purpose of this note is not to judge its merits;
it will instead focus on whether it should apply retroactively to conduct that occurred
prior to its effective date.
District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau of Wholesale Sales
Representatives v. Prudential Securities7 was the first case to address this issue. In
District 65, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia re-
fused to dismiss plaintiffs' RICO claims against a brokerage firm and one of its em-
ployees. The Court concluded no clear expression of congressional intent existed to
warrant retroactive application of §107. Moreover, eliminating the predicate acts on
which the plaintiffs had based their RICO complaint would impair the ability of the
plaintiffs to recover for acts violating federal law.8
The issue turned on the Court's reading of sections 107 and 108 of the Reform
Act. Section 107 of Title I of the Reform Act states, "no person may rely upon any
conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities
to establish a violation of section 1962 [of Title 18]." 9 Accordingly, the amendment
severely limits a RICO based securities fraud action." Nevertheless, the general tem-
poral applicability of the amendment is not stated. Section 108 of Title I, which deals
with general applicability of the statute, does not mention how the RICO amendment is
to be applied. Rather, it states that the other amendments of Title I -that modify the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933 do not apply to cases
pending." In other words, the amendments to the securities acts are given prospective
application. The defendants in District 65 argued §107 applies retroactively because all
other sections of Title I of the Reform Act were explicitly given prospective applica-
tion. The District 65 Court, relying on the framework set out in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products,2 rejected this argument: "[A]lthough Congress deliberately chose not to
apply the expansive securities law changes retroactively, it did not similarly express its
intent with respect to RICO actions standing alone. Congress' intent is not clearly
stated." 3 The RICO claims were not dismissed but the issue was certified for imme-
diate appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.'
4
Following District 65, this issue appeared elsewhere. Most courts follow the
logic of District 65."5 Nevertheless, three district courts held that §107 would be ap-
7. District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau of Wholesale Sales Representatives v.
Prudential Securities, 925 F. Supp. 1551 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
8. Id. at 1570.
9. § 107, 109 Sta, at 758.
10. The prohibition in §107 does not apply to if a defendant if he has been criminally convicted
for securities fraud. For an analysis of this exception see G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Secu-
rities Reform and RICO: A Lawyer's Dream, 23 Rico L. RPTR. 802, 808-812 (1996) [hereinafter
Blakey & Roddy].
11. Section 108 of the Reform Act provides: "The amendments made by this title shall not affect
or apply to any private action arising under title I of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 or title
I of the Securities Act of 1933, commenced before and pending on the date of enactment of this act."
§ 108, 109 Stat. at 758.
12. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
13. District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1570.
14. Prudential Securities, Inc. v. District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F. Supp. 1551 (N.D. Ga. 1996),
appeal docketed, No. 96-8481 (lth Cir. Apr. 24, 1996).
15. See Klein v. Boyd, No. 95-5410, 1996 WL 675554 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1996); Baker v.
Pfeifer, 940 F. Supp 1168 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 947 F.Supp. 180
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plied retroactively.'6 Litigation over retroactivity will become more prevalent, since
many RICO cases are pending that are based on conduct that occurred before the Re-
form Act became effective. Barring congressional action to rectify the problem, the
courts will be left to resolve the issue.
A strong presumption against retroactive legislation is a characteristic of Anglo-
American jurisprudence. Retroactive application of new law potentially works harsh
results. For this reason, it is considered unfair and violative of fundamental principles
of jurisprudence. 7 Individuals must know the law in order to follow it. When they
are aware of how their conduct will be judged, individuals form expectations and mod-
el their behavior in light of the law. Retroactive legislation, however, disrupts this pro-
cess. 8 When a law that alters legal relations for past conduct is enacted, expectations
are frustrated, behavior that was lawful becomes unlawful, and in many cases, individ-
uals are stripped of rights and remedies they once possessed. The Constitution itself
protects individuals from retroactive criminal law; the courts similarly do not apply
legislation retroactively unless Congress manifests a clear intent to the contrary.
This note argues that §107 of the Reform Act should not apply retroactively.
While Congress possesses the power to enact retroactive legislation, an intent is not
manifested in either the text of the amendment or the legislative history that justifies
retroactive application. Moreover, retroactive application will work a significant injus-
tice on plaintiffs who were injured by conduct that occurred prior to the Reform Act's
effective date. At the time of their injury, the law afforded them a RICO claim for
relief, and, in many cases, this will be the only remedy. That plaintiffs should be
stripped of a remedy that they possess is repugnant to basic notions of fairness.
Part II of this note examines the roots of the common law presumption against
retroactivity and how it evolved in American jurisprudence. Part III analyzes the legis-
lative history of the Private Litigation Securities Reform Act of 1995 to discern wheth-
er Congress manifested a clear intent for retroactive application of §107. Part IV of
this note will analyzes the text of the amendment and recent court decisions regarding
the retroactivity issue. Part V suggests some possible solutions to prevent similar prob-
lems in the future.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RETROACTIVITY
A. Background: The Historical Presumption Against Retroactivity
The policy against retroactive application of law is reflected in the legal founda-
tions of Western civilization. The Greeks recognized that retroactive legislation is
repugnant to the idea of fairness. 9 Roman Law also included a provision that new
(W.D.Pa. 1996); In Re Prudential Securities, 930 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Bromm v. Premier
Capital Investments, CV95-3327 (D. Neb. Aug. 7, 1996).
16. See Rowe v. Marietta Corp., No. 92-2963-D, 1997 WL 37055 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 29, 1997)
(plaintiffs' RICO claims dismissed; court held RICO amendment does not violate the presumption
against retroactivity in Landgraf); Reading Wireless Cable v. Steingold, No. CV-S-95-785-DWH (LRL),
1996 WL 7289045 (D. Nev. July 23, 1996) (§ 107 of the Reform Act applies retroactively to claims
filed before the statute's enactment); ABF Capital Management v. Askin Capital Management, No. 96
CIV. 2578(RWS), 1997 WL 27062 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1997) (§ 107 of the Reform Act applies retro-
actively to claims filed after the date the provision became effective, but filed after the provision be-
came effective).
17. NORMAN J. SINGER, SurHERLAND STATUTORY CoNsTRUCrnON § 41.02 at 341 (5th ed. 1993).
18. C. SANDS, SWrHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.05 at 261 (4th ed. 1972).
19. Smead, supra note 2, at 775 n.2 (citing SIR PAUL VINOGRANDOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL
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laws only govern future transactions unless it was made clear they were intended to
address past acts.2" The principle found its way into English common law through the
writings of Bracton.2" Coke, a student of Bracton, firmly embedded the principle into
common law jurisprudence by formulating it into a legal maxim that the English courts
quickly adopted.22 Coke's maxim was originally viewed as a rule of statutory
construction, but over time it was united with the concept of justice.23 English courts
only applied the principle where retroactive application of a law disadvantaged an indi-
vidual.24 While English courts and commentators recognized the principle as one of
its fundamental rules, the doctrine of legislative sovereignty that dominated the period
hampered its complete recognition.'
The policy against retroactive legislation reflects numerous concerns. First, stabil-
ity in our past transactions is necessary for closure and certainty.26 Individuals want to
know they can put past events behind them and focus on the future. Second, to plan
future conduct, knowledge of the law and how the law will view that conduct is re-
quired. Moreover, retroactive laws cannot deter unlawful conduct because the acts they
affect are already complete. Prospective legislation is the best way to encourage behav-
ior in the future.2 Last, corruption and partiality is avoided when legislation is passed
without "an exact knowledge of who will benefit."28
B. Retroactive Laws and American Jurisprudence
The Framers' antipathy to retroactive laws is illustrated in the Constitution. The
Constitution prohibits both the states and Congress from passing ex post facto laws and
bills of attainder. Additionally, states are prohibited from passing laws impairing con-
tractual obligations. While the ex post facto clause was held to apply only to criminal
laws, that this was the intention of the Framers is doubtful.29 In Calder v. Bull,' the
Supreme Court held that civil legislation did not fall within the scope of the ex post
facto clause. Justice Chase wrote the principal opinion basing his argument on the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention and the clause's common law usage.
Despite Chase's confidence in his reasoning, his reliance on the convention proceed-
ings is discredited.3' Moreover, Chase ignored the fact that two of his brethren were
JURISPRUDENCE 139, 140. Vinograndoff cites the example of Timokrates and the Athenian Ambassadors
to support this proposition. The Ambassadors withheld money owed to the city-state and then were
condemned to repay twice the amount. Timokrates attempted to absolve the ambassadors by passing a
law to eliminate the penalty. Demosthenes ruled that the law was invalid because it was retroactive.)
20. Id.
21. Id. at 776. Bracton is credited for carrying over many principles of the Roman civil law into
the common law through his work De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae. HENRIcI DE BRACTON,
LEcaus ET CoNsuEruINIBUs ANGLIAE 531 (Sir Travers Twiss tran., ed. 1990).
22. Smead, supra note 2, at 776 n.5 ("Likewise time is to be taken into account, since every new
constitution ought to impose a form upon future matters, and not upon things past.").
23. Id. at 778-80.
24. Id. at 776.
25. Id. at 780.
26. Scott M. Pearson, Note, Canons, Presumptions and Manifest Injustice: Retroactivity of the Civ-
il Rights Act of 1991, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPUINARY L.J. 461, 476 (1993) [hereinafter Pearson].
27. Id. at 476-77.
28. Id. at 477 n.83.
29. See William Winslow Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex-
Post-Facto Laws, 14 U. CI. L. REV. 539 (1947); Oliver P. Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution,
20 MICH. L. REV. 315 (1922).
30. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
31. See Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. 380, 413 (1829) (Constitution does not prohibit
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already on the record against the proposition.32 Justice Paterson33 acquiesced and
joined Chase's opinion but did express his uneasiness with the result:
I had an ardent desire to have extended the provision in the Constitution to ret-
rospective laws in general. There is neither policy nor safety in such laws; and
therefore, I have always had a strong aversion against them. It may, in general, be
truly observed of retrospective laws of every description, that they neither accord
with sound legislation, nor the fundamental principles of the social compact.'
In addition to Paterson, many other Framers shared similar beliefs about the scope of
the ex post facto clause.
James Madison, the principal author of the Constitution, firmly denounced retro-
active legislation in The Federalist as being "contrary to the first principles of the
social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation."3 Madison added:
The sober people of America are weary of fluctuating policy which has directed the
public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes
and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the
hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more industrious
and less informed part of the community. They have seen, too, that one legislative
interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent
interference being naturally produced by the effects of the proceeding. They very
rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish
speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and industry, and give
a regular course to the business of society.'
At the Constitutional Convention, delegates Oliver Ellsworth and Gouverner Morris
thought the clause unnecessary because they felt that it commonly understood that "ex
post facto laws were void of themselves."37 Madison recorded the vote on the ex post
facto clause to be a ban on "retrospective laws."3 Nevertheless, John Dickinson noted
the term "ex post facto" applied only to criminal laws and suggested that a provision
against retroactive civil laws also be added.39 Despite the adoption of the clause, the
records of the convention suggest many delegates believed they had banned retroactive
civil legislation as well.' Moreover, a few states incorporated a general prohibition
against all retroactive laws into their constitutions."
retrospective laws unless they violate the ex post facto or contracts clause). In Satterlee, Justice John-
son's opinion is a point by point refutation of Chase's opinion in Calder. Johnson had the benefit
of having the transcripts of the convention that were not available in print when Chase wrote his
opinion. For a brief discussion of Johnson's opinion see Field, supra note 29, at 330-31.
32. See Crosskey, supra note 29, at 560-61. Paterson expressed a contrary view in Van Home's
Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (1795).
33. Justice Paterson represented New Jersey at the Constitutional Convention.
34. Calder, 3 U.S. at 397.
35. The Federalist No. 44, at 282-83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
36. Id.
37. 2 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE CoNsTrrtloNAL CONvENION OF 1787, at 376 (1966).
38. Pearson, supra note 26, at 503.
39. Id. at 503. Dickinson relied on Blackstone as his authority for the proposition that ex post
facto applied to criminal laws only. Yet, William Crosskey suggests that Dickinson read Blackstone out
of context: "Blackstone was merely exemplifying the 'making of laws ex post facto,' and not defin-
ing such laws," he adds that Blackstone's proposition that "all laws should be therefore made to
commence in futuro" should apply to civil as well as criminal legislation. See Crosskey, supra note
29, at 546.
40. See Field, supra note 29, at 317-27.
41. New Hampshire, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee and Texas explicitly
1997]
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From a policy perspective, no rational reason exists to prohibit criminal but not
civil retroactive laws. All the concerns regarding notice, stability and deterrence are
equally applicable to both types of law. In Calder, Justice Chase defined four types of
criminal laws that violate the ex post facto clause:
1 st. Every law that makes an action done before passing of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggra-
vates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed. 3rd. Every law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to
the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence,
and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. 2
Retroactive application of civil law is only different because it usually involves a mon-
etary remedy. New burdens on past transactions are still unjust whether they be in the
form of criminal or civil sanctions. Civil defendants are in no better position than
criminal defendants to change their behavior when they have no notice of the law.
Finally, a change of law does not undo the injury a plaintiff received regardless of
whether it was the result of a criminal or tortious act.
Statutes such as RICO, that contain both criminal and civil causes of action,
illustrate the problems of only prohibiting retroactive criminal laws. The prohibition
against ex post facto laws protects a RICO defendant charged with predicate acts of
fraud, extortion and gambling when the suit is brought by the government. Neverthe-
less, when that same suit is brought by a private party, only a presumption against
retroactivity exists. Moreover, the only difference may be the plaintiff since the gov-
ernment can seek injunctive as well as monetary relief against RICO defendants. The
focus in both situations should be the conduct in question. Regardless of whether the
conduct results in criminal or civil charges, conduct that is unlawful when committed
should be punished or sanctioned. Moreover, the plaintiffs injured by the unlawful
conduct should have a cause of action regardless of how the law changes after the
injury. If it violates the Constitution to make past conduct criminal, then for the same
reason we should not allow laws to add or subtract civil liability for past conduct.
C. Pre-Landgraf: Conflicting Precedents
Prior to Landgraf, no definitive rule governed the retroactivity issue. Rather,
lower courts struggled with two conflicting Supreme Court precedents: Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital3 and Bradley v. Richmond School Board." Bowen
follows the traditional presumption against retroactive application of legislation. The
case concerned the validity of a 1981 Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) rule that set limits on reimbursement levels allowable for Medicare costs. After
a challenge by participating hospitals, the District Court struck down the regulation and
HHS reimbursed the hospital under the pre-1981 pricing index. In 1984, HHS attempt-
ed to reissue the 1981 pricing index rule by retroactively applying it to 1981. HHS
hoped to recoup its losses by using the old schedule. Again, the hospitals sued and the
prohibit retroactive civil legislation in their state constitutions. See SINGER, supra note 17, at §41.03.
42. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
43. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
44. Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
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Federal District Court granted summary judgment in their favor. The Supreme Court
affirmed the ruling and stated that "[rietroactivity is not favored in the law" and "con-
gressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive
effect unless their language requires this result."'45 Moreover, although the Court rec-
ognized that Congress possessed the power to make retroactive legislation, it added: it
"ought not to be extended as to permit unreasonably harsh action without very plain
words."' The Court offered no analysis on how it arrived at this conclusion; the pre-
sumably unanimous decision is based on the strength of common law principles
against retroactivity.'
In Bowen, the plaintiffs were parents who sought attorney's fees and expenses
after winning a protracted school desegregation suit. Although no statute authorized the
award, the Federal District Court awarded attorney's fees and expenses to the parents
based on equitable principles.' The Court of Appeals reversed this decision and stat-
ed, "if such awards are to be made to promote the public policy expressed in legisla-
tive action, they should be authorized by Congress and not by the courts."49 More-
over, the Court of Appeals refused to apply the new legislation passed authorizing
payment of attorney's fees in desegregation cases while the case was on appeal.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, thereby reversing the trial
court and granted the award to the parents. The Supreme Court concluded that a court
should "apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless such an ap-
plication. would result in manifest injustice or there is a statutory direction or legisla-
tive history to the contrary."'5 The defendant school district faced no additional bur-
den since similar awards were made before passage of the legislation. Moreover, appli-
cation of the statute did not alter the school district's constitutional obligation to pro-
vide a nondiscriminatory education."
In 1990, the Supreme Court acknowledged the "tensions" between the Bowen
and Bradley lines of cases, in Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno,"2
but did not resolve the issue. 3 Nevertheless, the issue would soon need to be ad-
dressed by the court. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, criticized Bradley for mis-
reading prior cases dealing with retroactivity.54 Noting that Bradley relied on many
45. Id. at 206.
46. Id. at 208 (quoting Brimstone R.Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 104, 122 (1928)).
47. See Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n Inc., 975 F.2d 886, 894 (D. D.C. 1992), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 1642 (1994).
48. Bowen, 416 U.S. at 696. The trial court predicated its ruling on two points: 1) the School
Board's actions had resulted in unreasonable delay in desegregating the schools, causing the parents
of the children to incur substantial expenditures to assert their constitutional rights; and 2) plaintiffs'
suit served an important public purpose in that it forced the School Board into compliance with the
law.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 711.
51. Id. at 720-21.
52. Kaiser Aluminum and Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990) (calculation of
postjudgment interest in antitrust suit properly runs from the date of the entry of judgment and not the
date of the verdict).
53. Id. at 834-37. The Court did not resolve the issue because under both Bowen and Bradley,
where congressional intent is clear it governs. The plain language of the statute at issue was clear in
its original and amended form that interest rate for any particular judgment runs from date of judg-
ment and single interest rate is to be used throughout the period of accrual.
54. Id. at 844-51. Bradley primarily relies on Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham,
393 U.S. 268 (1969) (holding appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
1997]
Journal of Legislation
cases involving judicial decisions rather than statutes and cases where the law was
changed after the issue was adjudicated, Scalia suggested that Bradley only applies in a
number of limited circumstances. He further added that Bradley's "manifest injustice"
test permits judges to exercise their own policy preferences and gives them the power
to "expand or contract the effect of legislative action.""5
[T]here is nothing to be said for a presumption of retroactivity .... It is contrary to
fundamental notions of justice, and thus contrary to realistic assessment of probable
legislative intent. The principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be
assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and
universal human appeal. It was recognized by the Greeks, Romans, by English
common law, and by the Code Napoleon. It has long been a solid foundation of
American law.'
Justice's Scalia's sentiments proved influential when the Court next addressed the
retroactivity issue.
D. Landgraf: Retroactivity Issue Resolved
The Supreme Court definitively addressed the issue of retroactivity in Landgraf
v. USI Film Products.7 In Landgraf, a female employee brought a sexual harassment
suit against USI under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5" The District Court
found that although she had been harassed, it was not so severe as to justify equitable
relief. At the time of the suit, Title VII did not provide for any other remedy and as a
result, Landgraf's claim was dismissed. While her appeal was pending, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act") that included a provision for com-
pensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional sexual harassment under Title
VII. 9 The Court of Appeals refused to remand Landgraf's case for a jury trial to
determine damages pursuant to the 1991 Act. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether §102 of the 1991 Act should be applied retroactively to cases pend-
ing at the time the Act became law.
The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by arguments that Congress intended to
apply the 1991 Act retroactively. In resolving the issue, the Court looked at the history
of the legislation, the text of the Act, and the tension existing between the Bowen and
Bradley cases. Examining the legislative history of the 1991 Act, the Supreme Court
found no clear intent to provide for retroactive application. Two pieces of evidence
support this conclusion. First, the House version of the 1991 Act contained an explicit
retroactivity provision when it was introduced, but the Senate substitute later agreed
upon omitted that provision.' Debate over the effective date offered many "partisan
statements" attempting to discern the meaning of the Act's "effective date" provision,
decision) and United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 U.S. 103 (1801) (holding that if subsequent to judg-
ment of trial court and prior to decision of appellate court, a law intervenes and changes the rule of
law that governs, the new law must be obeyed).
55. Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 857.
56. Id.
57. Landgraf, 511 U.S. 244.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). Section 102 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act provided for a jury trial
when damages for sexual harassment are claimed. It also provided a monetary remedy that did not
previously exist. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 254.
60. Id. at 262-63.
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but none were conclusive.6' Second, the President a year earlier had vetoed the 1990
Civil Rights Act citing "unfair retroactivity rules" as one reason for his disapproval.62
The Court speculated that this omission was not accidental: "it seems likely that one of
the compromises that made it possible to enact the 1991 version was an agreement not
to include the kinds of explicit retroactivity commands found in the 1990 bill.' 3
From this evidence, the Court found that the legislative history alone was not disposi-
tive on the issue of retroactive intent.
The Court next turned to an examination of the text of the statute. Landgraf ar-
gued that because the Act expressly provides for prospectivity in only two sections, it
should be inferred that the opposite was intended for the rest of the Act.' Skeptical
of Landgraf's expressio unius exclusio alterius' argument, the Court stated:
[g]iven the high stakes of the retroactivity question, the broad coverage of the
statute, and the prominent and specific retroactivity provisions in the 1990 bill, it
would be surprising for Congress to have chosen to resolve that question through
negative inferences from two provisions of quite limited effect.'
They further added that Landgraf's argument would "require us'to assume that Con-
gress chose a surprisingly indirect route to convey an important and easily expressed
message." 7 The Court was unwilling to read beyond the plain meaning of the text.
The legislative history showing that the House bill contained retroactivity language that
was omitted in the final Senate version further weakened Landgraf' s position. Justice
Stevens noted that the debate over the bill's effective date offers "no evidence that
Members believed an agreement had been tacitly struck on the retroactivity issue, and
little to suggest that Congress understood or intended the interplay of §§402(a), 402(b),
and 109(c) to have the decisive effect petitioner assigns them." The intent of one
House cannot be used as binding authority for the intent of the law.'
61. Id. at 262 n.15.
62. Id. at 256.
63. Id.
64. Landgraf relied on the text of three provisions of the Act to support her proposition:
§§402(a), 402(b) and 109(c). Section 402(a) states: "Except as otherwise specifically ,provided, this Act
and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment." Section 402(b), which both
parties stipulated was intended to exempt a particular disparate impact claim against Wards Cove Pack-
ing Company provides:
(b) CERTAIN DISPARATE IMPACT CASES.
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any
disparate impact cases for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for
which the initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983.
Section 109(c), applying Title VII to overseas employers states:
(c) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.
The amendments made by this section shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring
before the date of the enactment of this Act."
Landgraf contended that subsections 402(b) and 109(c) were the "other provisions" that to which
§402(a) referred. When these sections are read together they create a "strong negative inference that all
sections of the Act not specifically declared prospective apply to cases that arose before November 21,
1991." Id. at 257-58.
65. A principle of law that holds when one or more things of a class are expressly mentioned
others of the same class are excluded.
66. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 259.
67. Id. at 262.
68. Id. at 263.
69. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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Last, the Court set out to resolve the "apparent tension" between Bradley and
Bowen it acknowledged in Kaiser Aluminum. The Bradley line of cases stands for the
proposition that "a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,
unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is a statutory direction of
legislative history to the contrary."7 ° The Court noted that it will generally apply
Bradley where: 1) no vested right of a party has been substantially affected; 2) the
statute granted or removed jurisdiction from a particular judicial body; and 3) proce-
dural rules are involved.7 According to the Court, Bradley "did not alter the pre-
sumption against application... of new statutes that would have genuinely 'retroactive
effect." 7 Rather, Bradley can be distinguished on the grounds that determinations of
attorney's fees are "collateral to the main cause of action" and are an issue separate
from the cause of action to be proved at trial."3 Given that existing legal theories war-
ranted the award of attorney's fees, the new legislation "did not impose an additional
or unforeseeable obligation on the school board." '74 Additionally, the Court found
Bradley a compelling equitable case because it gave relief to parents who were at-
tempting to desegregate the public schools. Bradley does not undermine the presump-
tion against retroactivity, rather it elucidates the few and well defined exceptions that
exist in the doctrine.
The Bowen line of cases reflects the traditional disfavor for applying legislation
retroactively: "Retroactivity is not favored in the law.., even where some substantial
justification for retroactive rule-making is presented, courts should be reluctant to find
such authority absent a statutory grant."'75 According to Landgraf, courts have not
applied new legislation retroactively where it would: 1) affect a contractual or property
right; 2) affect rights that are "vested" in particular party; 3) add burdens to private
parties that were not in place prior to the enactment of the new law; or 4) impose new
monetary obligations on the government.76 If Congress clearly prescribes the reach of
the new legislation, then the language of the statute controls. In absence of any "ex-
press command," the court should follow the traditional presumption against retroactiv-
ity where "it would impair the rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a par-
ty's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions al-
ready completed."77
The Court concluded that §102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should not be
applied retroactively in Landgraf. Section 102(b) authorized punitive damages, a new
form of relief that did not exist prior to the filing of Landgraf s lawsuit. To allow
70. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.
71. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273-75.
72. Id. at 277.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208-09.
76. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270-73.
77. Id. at 280. These criteria appear illustrative and not exhaustive. Much of the Court's discus-
sion is focused on the increasing liability since Landgraf was seeking a new remedy that imposed new
liability on USI. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the same analysis should not be used when
determining whether liability is being reduced for past conduct. In fact, the Court states, "[t]he extent
of a party's liability, in the civil context as well as the criminal, is an important legal consequence
that cannot be ignored." Id. at 283-84. To support this point the Court mentions that state courts
"have consistently held that statutes changing or abolishing limits on the amount if damages available
in wrongful death actions should not, in the absence of clear legislative intent, apply to actions arising
before their enactment." Id. at 284 n.36.
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Landgraf to benefit from the new statutory remedy would provide her with "a new
right" that she did not have when she filed her original suit.7" The Court rejected
Landgraf' s contention that a procedural right was involved. The right to a jury trial
was not procedural in her case because its purpose was to award monetary damages.
Moreover, subjecting LSI to a jury trial for damages would increase their liability for
past conduct. The Court found that giving Landgraf a new remedy was fundamentally
unfair and violated the traditional presumption against retroactivity. To date, Landgraf
is the most definitive Supreme Court pronouncement on the issue of retroactivity.
HI. THE SECURITIES REFORM ACT OF 1995
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was the culmination of
numerous attempts to reform securities law. The Reform Act made sweeping changes
in substantive securities law. It significantly alters the conduct of private actions under
federal securities laws, the consequences of liability for those actions, and the stan-
dards for liability.79 While the original intent of the bill was to curb supposedly frivo-
lous lawsuits, particularly those filed for their settlement value, the bill that emerged
significantly effected even meritorious suits.' One of the most controversial provi-
sions is the removal of securities fraud as a predicate act for civil RICO.
A. History of RICO
In 1970, Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act."' RICO was created to
deal with the problem of "enterprise criminality." '82 RICO is effective because it pro-
vides for "enhanced criminal and civil sanctions" such as "fines, imprisonment,
forfeiture, injunctions, and treble damage[s].s 3 Many believe that RICO was only in-
tended to combat organized crime; courts and commentators alike, however, recognize
that RICO was drafted "broadly enough to encompass a wide range of criminal activi-
ty.""' Today, RICO is "the prosecutor's tool of choice against sophisticated forms of
crime."" Moreover, the treble damage provision of RICO is similar to antitrust law,
since it creates "a private enforcement mechanism that ... deter[s] violators and pro-
vide[s] ... ample compensation to the victims." Despite numerous attacks in the
courts, civil RICO survived and remains a viable means of combating fraud and cor-
78. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 283.
79. Avery, supra note 5, at 335.
80. Id.
81. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 802.
82. RICO shifts the focus from single acts and individuals to "patterns" of crimes and multiple
perpetrators. RICO is utilized to combat '"patterns' of violence, the provision of illegal goods and
services, corruption in labor or management relations, corruption in government, and criminal
fraud-expressly including fraud in the sale of securities by, through, or against various types of licit
or illicit 'enterprises"'. Id. See G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflec-
tions on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237 (1982) for a more detailed analysis of predi-
cate RICO acts.
83. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 802.
84. HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989).
85. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 803. Criminal RICO was not used with regularity until
about 1975. Since that time, criminal RICO actions number about 125 per year. Of those suits, ap-
proximately 39% have been in the area of organized crime, 48% in white collar crime, and 13% fall
in other areas (terrorism, anti-Semitic groups, etc.). Id.




In the wake of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,"' Congress attempted to limit
RICO to criminal use. The accounting and securities industries primarily fueled these
efforts. 9 After considerable Congressional hearings on the matter, legislation passed
the House but fell two votes shy in the Senate in 1986.90 In 1990, Congress proposed
a purchaser-seller limitation on RICO; this legislation failed to pass, but laid the foun-
dation for another reform effort in 1995."'
B. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
One of the first legislative initiatives of the newly elected Republican majority in
1994 was securities litigation reform. On February 27, 1995, Representative Thomas J.
Bliley (R-VA) introduced The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 in the
House of Representatives." Tne measure originally appeared as Title 1L of H.R.10,
the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995. After being referred to the House
Commerce and Judiciary Committee, the committee held hearings on the measure. The
Commerce Committee reported on Title II on February 24, 1995. 9' No RICO pro-
vision existed in the bill as reported.
Title H was renamed H.R. 1058 and introduced in the House on February 27,
1995.9' H.R. 1058 contained provisions regarding professional and lead plaintiffs,
class counsel, safe harbors for forward-looking statements, heightened pleading stan-
dards, fee shifting and other measures affecting private securities suits.95 The House
Commerce and Judiciary Committee held hearings on H.R. 1058 and made reports on
their findings. RICO reform was never mentioned in these hearings, and a RICO provi-
sion was not included in H.R. 1058 when it reached the House floor on March 6,
1995.9 The first mention of RICO came when Rep. Chris Cox (R-CA) introduced an
amendment proposing to "exempt from civil RICO any liability under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) any conduct actionable as securities fraud."97 Cox urged that this amend-
ment was necessary to curb "frivolous securities litigation" and that this provision was
originally included in the bill but was omitted "inadvertently" when the Commerce and
Judiciary versions were combined.98 Cox's position was criticized by Representative
John Conyers (D-MI) who said:
The problem that we have is that the gentleman's amendment is asking the Con-
87. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.. 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (fact that offending conduct is de-
scribed by reference to criminal statutes does not mean private civil action will be judged by criminal
standards of liability; no requirement that a defendant must be criminally convicted of a predicate act
or RICO violation before a treble damage suit can be brought under RICO).
88. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
89. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 803.
90. Id. at 804.
91. Id.
92. 141 CONG. REc. H124 (daily ed. Jan 4, 1995).
93. H.R. Rep. 104-50, pt.1 (1995).
94. 141 CONG. REC. H2306 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995).
95. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., (1995).
96. 141 CONG. REC. H2760, H2716 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995).
97. 141 CONG. REc. H2770 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995). The text of the amendment stated: "Section
1964(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting, except that no person may bring
under this provision if the racketeering activity, as defined in section 1961(1)(D), involves conduct
actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities before the period." Id.
98. Id.
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gress in broad daylight to believe that the biggest amendment for fighting civil
fraud that has ever been put on the books was accidently left out. I guess we acci-
dentally did not have any hearings. I guess there accidentally were not any witness-
es.... If it was an accident, let us go back and do it correctly. The provision of
this amendment is broader than any attempt at a modification of RICO, and the
gentleman knows it."
Cox further argued securities reform that did not address a change in RICO was mean-
ingless because RICO provided an "end run" around existing securities law."°e He
contended that RICO is oft6n used to "extort settlements from innocent defendants" by
plaintiffs who possess no chance of recovery.' °'
Representative Jack Fields (R-TX) explained how the amendment would change
the litigation of securities fraud: "H.R. 1058 ... has a losers pay provision. RICO
does not. H.R. 1058 preserves a one year statute of limitation. The RICO statute of
limitations is longer. H.R. 1058 limits joint and several liability to knowing securities
fraud; RICO does not.'""°e
Representative John Bryant (D-TX) contested Cox's claim that RICO was a
"loophole." Bryant read Cox the RICO statute which specifically states that "racketeer-
ing" includes "any offense involving fraud and the sale of securities." Cox responded
by arguing RICO was "never intended to apply to securities cases."' 3
Representative John Dingell (D-MI) offered another sharp criticism of Cox's
amendment; he pointed out that securities fraud was a part of RICO since its enact-
ment and "there is not one scintilla of evidence in the record of the Committee on
Commerce whether we should or we should not" change that."° Dingell argued that
this change would run counter to the confidence Americans have in our securities
market because it would weaken "an extraordinarily good system of private enforce-
ment." °0 Representative Edward Markey (D-MA), along with Dingell, noted that the
amendment would eliminate any civil RICO liability for Mafia involvement in the
securities industry."° Moreover, Dingell added that the amendment allowed a racke-
teer to avoid RICO liability so long as one of their predicate acts was securities
fraud." For example, a RICO defendant whose predicate acts include murder, nar-
99. Id. at H2765.
100. Id. at H2771.
101. Id.
102., Id. at H2775.
103. Id. at H2771.
104. Id. at H2774.
105. Id.
106. Id. Markey's concerns were based on subcommittee hearings in which "we had to have our
witnesses testify with bags over their heads because of the fear of retaliation by organized crime in
the penny stock market of this county." Id. at H2777.
107. Id. at H2778. Rep. Dingell's suggestion that the 1995 amendment to RICO covers all conduct
in a pattern, in which one of the predicate acts is fraud, is not supported by the text of the statute.
Conduct that can be characterized as "fraud in the purchase or sale or securities" should fall within
the amendment despite attempts to recharacterize the conduct through "artful pleading." Nevertheless,
the text of the 1995 amendment applies to "conduct that would have been actionable as fraud"; there-
fore, conduct that is not actionable as fraud is not covered by the amendment. While the legislative
history supports the view that any effort to use RICO in a securities fraud action should be eliminat-
ed, the plain text of the amendment does not reflect this intent. Given the Supreme Court's current
approach to statutory interpretation, it is unlikely that the intent manifested in the legislative history
will be enough to warrant deviating from the plain meaning of the statute. Congress may need to
amend the RICO amendment to give it the effect they intended. See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10,
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cotics, conspiracy and gambling in addition to securities fraud would not be subject to
RICO liability.1n 8 Dingell criticized the amendment as "sloppy work" and "an embar-
rassment to the House"; he urged the amendment be rejected."° Nevertheless, Cox's
amendment passed by a vote of 292 to 124."0
Senators Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Pete Domenici (R-NM) introduced S. 240, a
companion to H.R. 1058, on January 18, 1995."' Contrary to the later version of the
House bill, S. 240 did include a RICO provision that was similar to Cox's
amendment."' After being referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, the Subcommittee on Securities held hearings on S. 240. Arthur
Levitt, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, testified in support of a
provision that would "[e]liminat[e] the overlap between private remedies under RICO
and the federal securities laws."" 3 In a written statement to the subcommittee, Levitt
stated "[Itcca.se the secunities lw...s generally provide adequate remedies for those
injured by securities fraud, it is both unnecessary and unfair to expose defendants in
securities cases to the threat of treble damages and other extraordinary remedies pro-
vided by RICO."'"1 4 Despite strong opposition by the Bar of New York City which
characterized the proposal as "ambiguous" and "unworkable,""' the bill was passed
in committee by a vote of 11 to 4 and was presented to the full Senate on June 22,
1995.' 16
Contrary to the fierce debate in the House, the RICO provision was hardly men-
tioned in the Senate." 7 Only after extensive consideration of other amendments did
Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) offer an amendment that allowed the use of civil RICO
where the defendant was previously convicted for fraud." Additionally, the
amendment provided that the statute of limitations for the RICO action would accrue
from the final date of the conviction. Sen. Biden's amendment was accepted." 9
Soon after, the Senate substituted the text of S. 240 after the enacting clause of H.R.
1058 and passed the bill by a vote of 70 to 29.12°
The final version of the bill that emerged from conference committee contained
the RICO provision and reflected the amendment offered by Sen. Biden."' No new
at 809-10.
108. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 806.
109. 141 CONG. REC. at H2778.
110. Id. at H2778-79.
111. 141 CONG. REc. S1075 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995).
112. S. 240, 104th Cong. §105 (1995), 141 CONG. REC. S1078 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995).
113. Securities Litigation Reform Proposals S. 240, S. 667 and H.R. 1058: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 232
(1995).
114. Id. at 251.
115. 141 CONG. REc. S8885 (daily ed. June 22, 1995).
116. Id.
117. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 807-08.
118. 141 CONG. REC. 59163 (daily ed. June 27, 1995). Ironically, Biden suggested that he thought
"carving out securities fraud from the application of the civil RICO statutes . . . [was] a bad idea."
However, he chose not to debate the point. Id. For an excellent analysis of 1995 RICO exception, see
Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 808-12.
119. 141 CONG. REc. S9219 (daily ed. June 28, 1995).
120. Id.
121. Id. The amendment provides:
AMENDMENT TO RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
ACT.
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debate over the RICO provision occurred in conference and the committee report only
contained a short passage indicating the measure was supported by SEC Chairman
Levitt." The bill as reported passed easily in both the House and the Senate."2
President Clinton vetoed the bill on December 19, 1995, citing his objections to the
pleading standards, safe harbor provisions, and Rule 11 sanctions.'24 President
Clinton's objections did not mention the amendment to RICO. The bill returned to the
Congress and both the House and Senate voted to override the President's veto; no
new debate over the RICO provisions took place in the override debates.'25
The purpose of analyzing the legislative history of the Reform Act is to deter-
mine the Congressional intent regarding the general temporal applicability of the RICO
amendment. Despite considerable debate in the House over the amendment, and hear-
ings in the Senate, discussion of the applicability of the amendment never
occurred." If Congress did intend to apply the RICO amendment retroactively, that
intent is not manifested in any of the proceedings or debate that occurred prior to the
Act's passage. Further, if Congress did intend retroactive application it possesses the
power to amend the Reform Act to make its intent clear. Barring any legislative action,
the courts should not give effect to any suggestion that the RICO amendment applies
retroactively. Redrafting the statute is Congress' job, the courts should apply the
statute as written. '
IV. RECENT LITIGATION INVOLVING SECTION 107
A. District 65
District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau of Wholesale Sales Rep-
resentatives v. Prudential Securities, Inc.2 was the first case to raise the question of
whether sections 107 and 108 of the Reform Act apply retroactively. The plaintiffs in
the case were members of a voluntary pension trust established to provide retirement,
death and disability benefits to members of various industrial unions. They alleged that
the defendants, Prudential Securities, and its employee, William L. Kicklighter, Jr.,
Section 1964(c) of title 18, United States Code is amended by inserting before the peri-
od ", except that no person may rely upon conduct that would have been actionable as
fraud in the purchase of [sic] sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962",
provided however that this exception shall not apply if any participant in the fraud is
criminally convicted in connection therewith, in which case the statute of limitations shall
start to run on the date that the conviction becomes final.
122. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-43 (1995).
123. The House passed the bill by a vote of 320 to 102. 141 CONG. REc. 14055 (daily ed. Dec.
6, 1995). The Senate vote was 65 to 30. 141 CONG. REC. S17991, S17997 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995).
124. H.R. Doc. No. 104-150 (1995).
125. The House overrode the President's veto by a vote of 319 to 100. 141 CONG. REC. H15224
(daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995). Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa) mentioned that the bill included a provision
eliminating securities fraud from RICO but no substantive discussion took place. Id. at S19047 (daily
ed. Dec. 21, 1995). The Senate vote was 68 to 30. 141 CONG. REc. at S19047 (daily ed. Dec. 22,
1995).
126. Id.
127. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479. As early as 1985, the Supreme Court recognized that RICO
was being used for purposes not expressly intended by Congress: "We ... recognize that, in its pri-
vate civil version, RICO is evolving into something quite different from the original conception of its
enactors." Id. at 500. The Court also added that it was not their job to rectify the problem; rather that
where there is a "defect" inherent in the statute, "correction must lie with Congress." Id. at 499.
128. 925 F. Supp. 1551 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
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invested funds in securities inconsistent with the trust's investment objectives, en-
gaged in unauthorized trading, violated the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act's ("ERISA") trading regulations, violated the rules of securities associations, and
misrepresented and omitted material facts in dealing with the trust. 29 A RICO cause
of action based on fraud in the purchase or sale of securities was also included in the
pleading. 3 °
In late December of 1995, just after the Reform Act became law, the defendants
moved to dismiss the RICO claims, asserting the new RICO amendment precluded the
use of securities fraud as a predicate act for a RICO violation. The plaintiffs countered
by arguing "(1) the predicate acts set forth in their complaint [were] not based solely
upon conduct which would have been actionable as securities fraud, and (2) that even
if they were ... the amendment to the statute does not apply retroactively."' 3 The
District 65 court concluded that the allegations of mail and wire fraud were "so remote
as to not be in connection with the purchase or sale of securities."''3 In other words,
the mail and wire fraud charges were not affected by the RICO amendment, and there-
fore were not dismissed. Nevertheless, the court found it necessary to take up the
retroactivity question because the "allegations concerning defendants' representations
as to risk of investments, failure to disclose commission restrictions, and churning of
accounts would have been actionable as securities fraud claims."'1
The District 65 court used the framework set by the Supreme Court in Landgraf
to analyze the applicability of §107. Looking first at the statutory text of §§107 and
108, the court sought to determine whether it "manifests an intent that [section 107]
should be applied to cases that arose . . . before its enactment."'34 The defendants
argued the RICO amendment applies retroactively by implication. Section 108 states
that changes instituted by the Reform Act "shall not affect or apply to any private
action arising under Title I of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Title I of the
Securities Act of 1933, commenced before and pending on the date of enactment of
this Act."'35 Since Congress did not include the RICO amendment within the pro-
spective application of §108, the defendants inferred that §107 was meant to apply
retroactively. A similar argument was made and rejected in Landgraf, where the Su-
preme Court noted, "[g]iven the high stakes of the retroactivity question . . . it would
be surprising for Congress to have chosen to resolve that question through negative
inferences drawn from two provisions of quite limited effect."'" According to
Landgraf, courts should not depart from the general rule of prospective application
where Congress has only made its intent known by implication. Therefore, the court
rejected the defendants' textual argument that §107 applies retroactively.
The next part of the Landgraf framework requires the court to determine whether
129. Id. at 1558.
130. Id. at 1566. The plaintiffs alleged the following as RICO predicate acts: fraud under 18
U.S.C. § 1343 (1994), mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) and fraud in the sale of securities
under 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994 & Supp. 1995). Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1568.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting LaMdgraf, 511 U.S. at 257).
135. Id. (quoting Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, §108, 109
Stat. 737, 758).
136. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 259.
[Vol. 23:283
The Securities Reform Act of 1995
the case would fall into one of the exceptions carved out by the Bradley line of cases.
In order to do so, Landgraf instructs the court to ask whether the new legislation
would impair rights the party possessed when they acted, increase liability for past
conduct, or create new duties with respect to transactions already completed.'37 The
District 65 court found the sole issue was whether §107 impaired the rights the plain-
tiffs had when they filed the suit. 3'
The plaintiffs in District 65 had a RICO cause of action based on mail and wire
fraud when they filed their suit in 1994. Nevertheless, they were unable to file a non-
RICO securities fraud suit because the statute of limitations expired before their com-
plaint was filed. If the plaintiffs were not allowed to use mail and wire fraud as the
basis for a RICO suit, they would be denied relief. The court concluded that retroac-
tive application of §107 "impairs the plaintiffs' ability to recover for actions which
may have violated federal law."'3 9 Absent a clear intent for retroactive application
and the fact a "vested right" was at stake, the court held retroactive application of
§107 would be a "manifest injustice" and it would not read the statute to apply retroac-
tively."'
B. Reading and Rowe: The Case for Retroactivity
A number of recent district court decisions follow District 65."4' Nevertheless,
support for District 65 is not unanimous. Three cases, Reading Wireless Cable Televi-
sion Partnership v. Steingold,42 Rowe v. Marietta Corp.,43 and ABF Capital Man-
agement v. Asking Capital Management,'" apply §107 retroactively. The defendants
in these cases made essentially the same argument as the defendants in District 65:
that silence in §108 on the general applicability of the RICO amendment (§107), in
conjunction with a clear congressional intent to apply §108 prospectively, shows con-
gressional intent to apply the RICO amendment retroactively. 45
All three cases use different evidence in the legislative history to support ret-
roactive application. For example, the Reading court found that the Conference Com-
mittee's adoption of the House version of the applicability provision provided compel-
ling evidence of retroactive intent." The Senate version of the applicability provi-
sion stated, "[tihe provisions included in Title I of this Act apply to any private action
commenced after the date of enactment."'47 The court conceded that had this version
been enacted, §107 would not apply retroactively. However, the Conference Committee
adopted the House's applicability version, and later this version was enacted into
137. Id. at 280.
138. District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1569. The court concluded that the RICO amendment did not in-
crease a party's liability for past conduct nor did it impose new duties with respect to transactions
already completed in the case. Id. Therefore, the court was left to examine whether the amendment
impaired the plaintiffs' rights when they acted. Id.
139. Id. at 1570.
140. Id.
141. See supra note 15 for decisions following District 65.
142. No. CV-S-95-785-DWH(LRL), 1996 WL 728045 (D. Nev. July 23, 1996).
143. No. 92-2963-D, 1997 WL 37055 (W.D. Tenn. Jan 29, 1997).
144. No. 96 CIV. 2578(RWS), 1997 WL 27062 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1997).
145. Reading, 1996 WL 728045 at *1; Rowe, 1997 WL 37055, at *9; ABF, 1997 WL 27062 at
*7-*8.
146. Reading, 1996 WL 728045, at *2.
147. S.240, 104th Cong., § 110 (1995).
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law." Neither the Senate Report nor the House Conference Report offers an expla-
nation for this substitution. Yet, the court found this to be persuasive evidence that
Congress did not intend to limit application of §107 to cases commenced after enact-
ment. 49
Reading and Rowe probed into the nature of the RICO amendment to support the
conclusion that §107 should have retroactive effect. The Reading court observed that
§107 is unique because it was not intended to "identify and prohibit abusive litigation
conduct."'" Rather, its purpose was to eliminate the "unnecessary and unfair piling
on of liability" in securities fraud cases where adequate remedies already existed to
combat fraudulent conduct.' 5' Further, the Rowe court noted that "Congress intended
RICO as a weapon against organized crime, not as a weapon against ordinary investors
and the business community.
' '152
While Reading and Rowe off.- argpl ument from th. Reform Act's
legislative history, their evidence hardly manifests a "clear" intent for retroactivity.
First, both courts misread Landgraf. The Supreme Court in Landgraf rejected a similar
claim where plaintiffs argued by way of negative inference that a provision applied
retroactively. Second, the procedural history of the inclusion of the RICO amendment
also weakens the argument for retroactivity. The RICO amendment was an eleventh
hour addition to the Reform Act. Several House members severely criticized the inclu-
sion of the RICO amendment because it did not go through the normal legislative
hearing process.'53 Moreover, had Congress intended retroactive application of §107,
it most likely would appear somewhere in the record. Despite extensive House debate
on the merits of eliminating a RICO cause of action for securities fraud, the record is
void of any discussion of retroactive application of the amendment. 4 Given the late
inclusion of the amendment into the bill, it is likely that §108's express statement of
prospectivity was simply overlooked or the result of poor drafting. 5 The evidence
cited by Reading and Rowe does little to overcome the strong presumption against
retroactivity laid down by Landgraf
The defendants in Rowe also argued that §107 is a purely jurisdictional provision
and therefore qualifies as an exception to Landgrafs general rule." The Rowe court
reasoned that jurisdictional rules are exempt because they "take[] away no substantive
148. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., §108 (1995), provides that "[tihe amendments made by this title
shall not affect or apply to any private action under Title I of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 and Title I of the Securities Act of 1933, commenced before and pending on the date of enact-
ment of this act."
149. Reading, 1996 WL 728045, at *2.
150. Id.
151. Id. The court cites the testimony of SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt as authority on this point.
152. Rowe, 1997 WL 37055, at *13 (citing Rep. Cox).
153. See 141 CoNG. REc. H2777 (daily ed. March 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Markey). Represen-
tative Markey stated:
Is it proper for this Congress to take up an issue of such a magnitude with no hear-
ings. To then come out here with a historic amendment to a separate piece of legisla-
tion with the Committee on Rules having a special hearing last night to put in order a
nongermane amendment to a piece of legislation that has nothing to do with the busi-
ness, and then asking our Members to rush out here at 6:30 and cast a vote on that, it
is unfair. It is wrong. ...
154. See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
155. Baker v. Pfeifer, 940 F. Supp. 1168, 1178-79 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
156. Rowe, 1997 WL 37055, at *11.
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right, but simply change[] the tribunal that is to hear the case."'' 7 Additionally, the
court noted "[p]resent law normally governs in such situations because jurisdictional
statutes 'speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the
parties.""58 While Landgraf does provide for a jurisdictional rule exception, §107 is
not a jurisdictional provision. It does not repeal RICO nor does it withdraw the juris-
diction of the federal courts to hear RICO claims. Rather, §107 only restricts RICO's
definition of "racketeering activity."'59 Section 1964(c) of RICO is a "multi-faceted
statutory provision. ' ' "w It provides a private right of action to sue for treble damages
and that such suits may be brought "in any appropriate United States district
court." Section 107 limits the predicate acts on which RICO actions are based, but
it does not change the jurisdiction of the district courts to hear those claims. Given
Justice Stevens' assertion in Landgraf that the "jurisdictional exception" applies where
the statute speaks to the power of the court and not to the rights and obligations of
parties, the Rowe court's characterization of §107 as a jurisdictional statute is erro-
neous.
62
The Rowe court illustrates a common theme among the cases finding against
retroactive application of §107. In every case, the plaintiffs were barred from bringing
§10(b) actions for securities fraud because the limitations had run on those claims.
Where §10(b) claims had not run, Rowe claimed the plaintiffs' legitimate expectations
and rights to recovery were not impaired."6 While in the ordinary case this will
probably be true, conceivably some claims that are not actionable under securities law
may be actionable under RICO.' Claims for relief under securities fraud must com-
mence within one year after discovery and within three years of the violation." Nev-
ertheless, the RICO statute of limitation is four years.'" Moreover, a consistent rule
for the point of accrual has not been determined.'67 Given that RICO focuses on "dis-
covery" and "injury" while securities law emphasizes "violations" and different periods
of limitations, a RICO claim may still be actionable after the statute of limitations has
run on the securities claim. Last, §107 does not preclude the possibility that securities
fraud may be plead as a predicate act for aiding and abetting or conspiracy to violate
RICO.'a
157. Id. (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916)).
158. Id. (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 2740 (citation omitted)).
159. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 814. See 18 U.S.C. §1961(1)(D) (1994) (defining "racke-
teering activity" to include "fraud in the sale of securities").
160. Blakey & Roddy, see supra note 10, at 814.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
162. See also United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1517 (Landgraf exception ap-
plies only to a statutory amendment "explicitly effect[ing] a jurisdictional bar").
163. Rowe, 1997 WL 37055 at *14.
164. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 810 for a more extended discussion of "actionable con-
duct."
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1994).
166. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987).
167. While there is no consensus among the circuits most are following "some variation of a 'dis-
covery' rule ('knew or should have known') that focuses on the sufficiency of the acts in the al-
leged 'pattern' for liability and 'injury' caused by . . . those acts constituting the 'pattern."'
Blakey & Roddy, supra note 9, at 810. See also Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 87 F.3d 231 (8th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 117 S.CL 725 (1997).
168. For the purposes of the RICO amendment, any conduct which is "actionable" under the secu-
rities fraud cannot be used as a predicate act for a RICO claim. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
imposed a purchaser-seller limitation on a lOb-5 implied private cause of action thereby precluding any
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C. ABF Capital Management
Only one case has addressed whether the RICO amendment applies to all cases
brought after the Reform Act's passage, or only to cases relying on. conduct that oc-
curred after its passage. In ABF Capital Management, the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York dismissed plaintiffs' RICO claims based on conduct that
occurred before the Act's effective date, but were not filed until after the Act became
law. The plaintiffs argued that application of the Reform Act to their claim violated the
"vested rights" prong of the Landgraf test. The Court rejected this argument, however,
stating that, "A cause of action that has not been reduced to a final judgment is not a
'vested right'."'" Since the plaintiffs were still able to bring a common law fraud
claim against the defendants, the court held that elimination of a treble damages reme-
d .. nde. RICO w a not unjus.
The ABF Capital Managment Court contends that "[n]othing in Landgraf implies
that a vested right occurs immediately upon a party's conduct." 7 ° This statement is
misleading. First, the Supreme Court does not define what rights are "vested" for
retroactivity purposes in Landgraf. Generally, however, vested rights are defined as
those rights that "have so completely and definitely accrued to or settled in a person
that they are not subject to be defeated or cancelled by the act of any other private
person."'' Second, such accrual, a question of federal law, usually occurs when three
elements are present: a violator, violation and injury.' A rule that would not protect
causes of action as property rights until they are reduced to a final judgment, on the
other hand, would work harsh results. Under that rule, no difference would exist be-
tween the plaintiff who has just been injured and one who was, after the expenditure
of great time and expense, a day from receiving a judgment. Manifestly, the two
parties are not similarly situated.
Moreover, a marked distinction exists between the right to a remedy and a right
to a cause of action.' If a remedy is changed, a plaintiff may not get what he ex-
pected but he will still receive some form of relief. When an accrued cause of action is
extinguished before judgment, the plaintiff is denied the opportunity to have his case
heard and ultimately is barred from any relief for his injury.'74
action for aiding and abetting or conspiracy to violate lOb-5. If aiding and abetting and conspiracy
are not "actionable" under the securities laws, then they are still viable for a RICO cause of action.
For example, a plaintiff is not precluded from filing a conspiracy to violate RICO claim based on
mail or wire fraud against a defendant who has defrauded them. See Blakey & Roddy, supra note
10, at 810.
169. ABF Capital Management, 1997 WL 27062 at *9 (quoting Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. v.
United States, 888 F. Supp. 543, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
170. Id. at *9 (quoting In re Industrial Freight Sys., Inc. 191 B.R. 825, 829 n.7 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1996).
171. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1564 (6th ed. 1990).
172. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947) (accrual is a question of federal law); United
States v. Kubrich, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979) (accrual for statute of limitations) ("that he had been hurt
and who has inflicted the injury").
173. Rhodes v. Jones, 351 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1965) ("A cause of action is a situation or
state of facts which entitles a party to sustain an action and gives him the right to seek judicial inter-
ference in his behalf ... [T]he cause of action is something different from the remedy or relief
sought").
174. See Elizabeth Louise Loeb, Note, Constitutional Fallout From the Warner Amendment: Annihi-
lating the Rights of Atomic Weapons Testing Victims, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1355 (1987) ("Victims
of atomic weapons testing have not yet acquired vested property interests in recovery but have ac-
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While jurisprudence on the issue is hardly settled, the Supreme Court recognizes
that claims for compensation may constitute property for due process. 7 Lower
courts properly extend due process protection to various tort claims.'76 While these
cases do not directly address the issue involved in ABF Capital Management, taken in
the context of the issue of protecting accrued claims as "property" for due process,
they support the proposition that extinguishing an accrued cause of action impairs
property rights protected by the Constitution.'"
Defendants who committed securities fraud were on notice that their conduct
violated RICO. Moreover, allowing plaintiffs to rely on this cause of action does not
increase their liability for past conduct. As discussed above, statutes of limitations and
accrual problems may prevent many plaintiffs from receiving relief from causes of
action other than a RICO suit. Plaintiffs and defendants are now on notice that securi-
ties fraud is no longer actionable as a RICO predicate offense. Applying this provision
to conduct that occurred before this amendment was passed, however is unjust and will
deprive plaintiffs of a legitimate tool of recovery that existed at the time they were
injured.
V. CONCLUSION
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act is the culmination of years of work
by the securities and accounting industries to curb "abusive" securities litigation. While
ambitious in its scope, the legislation "suffer[s] from a lack of agreement on the nature
quired vested property interests in the right to sue defense contractors for their injuries").
175. Id. at 1347. See also Logan v. Zinunerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430-32 (1982) (injured
worker's right to use FEPA's adjudicatory procedures is a "species of property protected by the Due
Process Clause"; state can determine preconditions to bringing action, but once granted, it cannot re-
move them without "appropriate procedural safeguards"); Mullane v. Central Hanover, 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950) (judicial proceeding to settle fiduciary accounts deprive beneficiaries the right to have trust-
ee answer for negligent management, such rights are property and cannot be cut off without due pro-
cess; "[r]any controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process clause
but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivations of life, liberty or property
by adjudication be proceeded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case"); Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933) (depositor of insolvent bank was not de-
prived due process when legislative action provided a different means through which he receive liqui-
dated assets; "although a vested cause of action is property and is protected from arbitrary interfer-
ence ... the appellant has no property, in the constitutional sense, in a particular form of remedy; all
that he is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is the preservation of his substantial right to re-
dress by some effective procedure') (citation omitted); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 435, 442
(1932) (state could not extinguish contractual liability of corporate officers to shareholders by repealing
corporation law; "the right of the petitioner to enforce respondent's liability had become fully perfected
and vested prior to the repeal of the liability provision"); Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 156,
158 (1913) (statutory cause of action against city became vested at the time damage occurred; repeal-
ing statutory remedy did not extinguish plaintiffs' right to compensation).
176. Id.
177. Id. See, e.g., Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 973 (5th Cir. 1983) (right to bring wrongful
death action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a property right and may not be denied without due process);
In re Aircrash on Apr. 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs' rights to recover for
wrongful death are "property" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment: "there is no question that
claims for compensation are property interests that cannot be taken for public use without compensa-
tion"); Hartford Fire Insurance Co., v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodennberger, Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d
1362, 1368 (6th Cir. 1984) (property right arises for due process purposes arises once injury actually
occurs); Greyhound Food Management, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1207, 1219 (W.D. Ohio
1986) (statute that retroactively barred claims against municipalities under subrogation provisions of
insurance violated due process).
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and extent of the problems it was seeking to redress."'7 Moreover, it provides no
"uniform policy" or "theoretical framework," and as a result, courts will spend years
unravelling the scope of its many provisions. The RICO amendment reflects this
problem. Added to the Act late in its history, without proper legislation hearings and
debate, the amendment creates more confusion than clarity. Ironically, it will be the
courts and not the legislature that has the last word on the amendment's applicability.
Where Congress did not provide a clear intent for a statute's applicability,
courts resort to the judicial default rule that new law applies prospectively. Proponents
of retroactive application offer no compelling textual evidence to overcome this pre-
sumption. The text of the amendment is silent on applicability and, when faced with a
similar situation, the Supreme Court held that it would not find retroactive application
through negative inference.
Proponents of retroactive application can produce no clear evidence of retroactive
intent in the debates and hearings that proceeded the amendment's enactment. In fact,
the evidence is to the contrary. The fact that the amendment passed and was supported
by the SEC can not be imported to support retroactive application. Rather, the RICO
amendment was a eleventh-hour addition to a bill that was fueled by powerful special
interests. No substantive discussions on applicability took place when the amendment
was offered; further, the amendment did not go through the formal hearing process. To
suggest that the amendment was "inadvertently" omitted only serves to add further
insult to plaintiffs whose meritorious causes of action are in jeopardy.
The number of suits affected by the RICO amendment is difficult to estimate.
Nevertheless, Mark Griffin, the chairman of the Securities Litigation Reform Task
Force of the North American Securities Administrators Association, projects the impact
might be severe. Griffin's projections show that the Reform Act will impact 1.79
million investors and deprive them the right to recover approximately $2.87 billion
over the next five years."s Regardless of how the financial stakes are calculated, the
reality is that many plaintiffs that were injured by conduct that was unlawful when
committed will be deprived relief if the RICO amendment is given retroactive effect.
Congress can avoid the problems in the Reform Act and the Civil Rights Act of
1991 by carefully drafting statutes, and particularly amendments that significantly
change the structure of a bill. Most legislation is drafted by congressional staff and
committee counsel. It is their responsibility to make sure amendments fit into the over-
all structure of a bill and to also inform the members of Congress of potential side
effects of amendments. For example, when §107 was offered as an amendment to the
Reform Act, §108 should have been amended to clarify the applicability of the RICO
provision. At a minimum, every statute should clearly state its limitations period and
its general temporal applicability. These are not unreasonable demands. Considering
the wealth of resources available to congressional committees, these provisions should
be standard in all new legislation. The dockets of the federal courts are already beyond
capacity. Congress could alleviate some of this burden by saving the courts the job of
interpreting poorly drafted legislation.
Another possible solution to the problem is an amendment to Title I of the
178. Avery, supra note 5, at 337.
179. Id.
180. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 816.
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United States Code to include guidelines for retroactive application of legislation.
Currently, the courts are left the task of determining the applicability of ambiguous
legislation. The current default rule was laid out in Landgraf, where the Supreme
Court said it will not apply a statute retroactively where the statute "would impair
rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct or
impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed."'81 Such an
amendment would serve two purposes: it would reduce litigation over questions of
retroactivity and it would allow Congress, rather than the courts, to define the parame-
ters of when a statute applies retroactively.
The statute of limitations will eventually run on all conduct that still is actionable
as a RICO cause of action for securities fraud, making this issue moot. Nevertheless,
in the interim, many plaintiffs with real injuries and meritorious suits risk losing their
recovery if courts continue to apply §107 retroactively. A strong presumption against
retroactivity is present in American jurisprudence. It is contrary to basic principles of
justice to extinguish a cause of action from a plaintiff injured by a defendant who was
aware the conduct was unlawful when committed. The courts should therefore follow
the District 65 holding and refuse to apply §107 retroactively.
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